European Muslim communities' views on foreign policy constitute a growing topic of research. This paper presents a case study of the status of the Palestinian issue in France and focuses on one particular actor, namely the UOIF (Union of Islamic Organizations of France).
France is home to the largest Muslim community in Europe. Muslims do not constitute a homogenous group but are characterized by various forms of belonging to Islam, from rigorous religious practice to cultural affiliation (Frégosi 2008 ), that's why the title of this article refers to Muslim communities. When it comes to foreign policy issues, the symbolic allegiance and feeling of belonging to the Arab world feed sensitivity to the Palestinian question (Cesari 1991) .
Given these conditions, talks about the 'importation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict' are recurrent in the public sphere. Expressions such as 'intifada des banlieues' and 'importation du conflit israélo-palestinien' evoke the opposition of Muslim and Jewish communities as a result of the conflict and anti-Semitic incidents because of Israel's policy (Hecker 2007 ).
The French political opportunity structure rejects ethnic group politics. In a centralized framework which is unfavorable to the expression of specific interests, it is even more difficult to mobilize. If foreign policy is not a prior concern for French voters, including Muslim French voters (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006 , 218: IFOP 2006 , the Palestinian issue seems to constitute an exception, at least for a part of French voters with a Muslim background. Muslims' foreign policy views are generally close to the general population, except precisely on the Palestinian issue (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006 ) which crystallizes activism.
After a theoretical framing of the relation between ethnic groups and foreign policy and after situating the Palestinian question in the French context, this paper chooses to focus on one particular Muslim organization, namely the UOIF (Union of Islamic Organizations of France), which is notorious for its grassroots activism and where solidarity with the Palestinians is heavily displayed. Empirical evidence is gathered through the content analysis of several documents and press releases issued by the UOIF. The investigation of such data aims at characterizing how the UOIF frames the conflict and its mobilization on the issue. Polls and surveys, which are usually also reported in the press constituted another source of data to try to understand French Muslims as a group of individuals. In parallel, as we also need to consider the institutional aspect, some documents of the UOIF were consulted on the UOIF website 1 The media is a useful source to collect the views and feelings of different actors: in the French case, this is all the more a valuable source given the rejection of any official recognition of ethnic groups.
How does UOIF frame the Palestinian issue? How is does it conceive and carry out mobilization?
What are UOIF's incentives for such mobilization?
Ethnic groups and foreign policy
When we talk about 'ethnic groups and foreign policy', it is usually and implicitly inferred that we actually mean 'ethnic groups and foreign policy in the United States': there is a wide range of literature dedicated to this question, from general studies about this relationship (Ahrari 1987; Deconde 1994; Shain 1999 : Smith 2000 : Ambrosio 2002 to specific case studies (Croucher 1996 : Haney & Vanderbush 1999 : Walt & Mearsheimer 2006 . Some observers have a negative view of ethnic lobbying seen as jeopardizing the national interests (Huntington 1997) while others consider ethnic groups as potential agents for the promotion of democratic values in their countries of origin, which can benefit the United States (Shain 1999 (Allen 2006 ). This analysis precisely takes the Palestinian issue as a case study in the French context.
The Palestinian question in the French context
Even before the arrival of Muslim immigrants in the seventies, France already had its "Arab policy". This policy had been relatively stable since 1967 whereas at that time, the Muslim presence in France was very small (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 216) . Until the end of the Algerian war, France was Israel's ally. After the Accords d'Evian, the 1967 war marked a shift, and France began selling weapons to Arab countries. Since that time, French foreign policy is considered to be pro-Arab, a policy originally conceived as a Gaullist one.
Positive opinions about Israel had been the rule in the sixties except for the Communist Party, which was aligned with the Soviet Communist Party. The first shift came from non-leftist intellectuals at the time of the Lebanon war in 1982 (Wieviorka 2005 , 196: Vidal 2005 .
Then, the Intifada profoundly changed the perception of the conflict. Wieviorka notes that the sympathy for the Palestinians could only be reinforced as the contestation, which until then had mostly been external and conveyed through terrorism was now coming from abated young people (Wieviorka 2005, 196) . The second wave of sympathy came from Muslims who, given their lack of socio-economic integration and the strong discrimination issues, could identify with Palestinians (Wieviorka 2005, 197) . The radicalization of these two movements was taking place while the Jewish leadership in France showed more and more support to the Israeli government (Wieviorka 2005, 197) . The picture is different concerning Muslims. Muslims' sympathy goes in majority to Palestine (78%) (Allen 2006) . Only 8% say their sympathy goes to both parties while 7% says their sympathy goes to none (Allen 2006) . 6% say their sympathy goes to Israel (Allen 2006 ).
However, Brouard and Tiberj highlight the relative character of the opposition to Israel: if 30% of the French people with an immigrant background reckon that Israel bears the greatest responsibility in the conflict (13% of the French overall population), 65% consider both parties are equally responsible for it, which is close to the 75% of the French overall population also condemning both parties (Brouard & Tiberj 2006a, 105) .
As a conclusion, even though the Palestinian question is the only issue which can be considered as an issue of interest to French Muslims, some evidence seems to indicate that the indifference or the neutrality characterizing French public opinion might be extended to at least a part of French Muslims. However, if foreign policy is a relatively minor issue for French voters, including French Muslims, it can still play a role in electoral choices for the most politicized, especially for students and youth, a core component of UOIF (Vaïsse 2007b ).
Mobilization on Palestine: the case of UOIF
The Union of Islamic Organisations in France (UOIF) is a strong grassroots force which was founded in 1983 and gained visibility in 1989 with the Salman Rushdie affair and first cases related to the headscarf. It comprises 250 civil associations, controls 13.5 % of prayer spaces (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 105) and is theologically situated in the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood. The organisation is mostly financed by foreign donors. Its relative success comes from efficient networking at the grassroots level on the one hand and its efficient insertion in transnational networks on the other hand (Zehgal 2005, 5) : it is also the French branch of the Though solidarity with the Palestinians is heavily displayed, it does not necessarily translate into strong political action. Indeed, it is felt through "militantisme distancié"
(distanciated activism), for example through charities (Godard & Taussig 2007, 72) . There is politicization through identification and the subsequent positioning on a particular policy or event, but political mobilization as such does not necessarily follow as it implies the need for organization and resources (Bennani-Chraïbi 2007, 152) . Indeed, the UIOF admits no political ambition on this front. Its president, Lhaji Brèze said in an interview: "Concerning the situation in Palestine, the UOIF has neither the mandate nor the power to enter into political complexities.
And so we have decided to act on the humanitarian front" (Ternisien 2005) . In fact institutionalization via the CFCM has also entailed, for UOIF leaders, the refusal to "import" or The press also noted the relief of local authorities as the Gaza crisis implications stayed within the realm of political and public expression (Delberghe, Garin and Zappi 2009) 
